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China announced its new Coast Guard Law containing worrisome provisions that need further clarification. Japan, a prominent claimant in the East China Sea, feels threatened by this law.  

East Asia is a huge seascape. As a result, the sea’s connecting power is of a priceless importance to the entire region. The rules-based international maritime order is in everyone’s interest, including Japan.

The great geostrategist Nicholas Spykman once described the South China Sea as the ‘Asiatic Mediterranean’ to emphasise its importance in Asian geopolitics. Just as the Roman Empire sought control over the Mediterranean and the United States over the Caribbean in pursuit of regional dominance, China seeks dominance over the South China Sea, making it a ‘Chinese Caribbean.’

Contrary to popular belief, Lorem Ipsum is not simply random text. It has roots in a piece of classical Latin literature from 45 BC, making it over 2000 years old. Richard McClintock, a Latin professor at Hampden-Sydney College in Virginia, looked up one of the more obscure Latin words, consectetur, from a Lorem Ipsum

Contrary to popular belief, Lorem Ipsum is not simply random text. It has roots in a piece of classical Latin literature from 45 BC, making it over 2000 years old. Richard McClintock, a Latin professor at Hampden-Sydney College in Virginia, looked up one of the more obscure Latin words, consectetur, from a Lorem Ipsum

After months of internal debate within the Obama administration, the guided missile destroyer USS Lassentransited within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef, one of China’s artificially-built features in the South China Sea, on October 27 in what is termed a “freedom of navigation” (FON) operation. It was accompanied by two maritime surveillance aircraft, a P-8A Poseidon and a P-3 Orion.

UNCLOS provided guidelines, but was not determinative. The conclusive round of Sino-Vietnamese negotiations (1992-2000) was facilitated by the parties’ informal agreement in 1993 that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) would furnish the basic principles to be applied to resolving maritime boundary disputes. They also agreed that international practice, equity, and relevant circumstances would be given appropriate weight in negotiations. The parties did not use their respective interpretations 

China’s foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang criticized the exercise, saying the U.S. Navy ship “illegally entered” the waters near the islands “without receiving permission from the Chinese government,” “threatened China’s sovereignty and security interests,” and “endangered regional peace and stability.”

After several years of surveys, Japan incorporates the Senkaku Islands through a formal Cabinet decision. The incorporation is based on the islands having terra nullius status – they were unoccupied by any nation, belonging to no one. Tokyo argues that its incorporation was independent of its activities during the Sino-Japanese war. China disputes Japanese arguments that the Senkakus were truly terra nullius and that the 

The Japan-Korea Treaty of Amity, also known as The Treaty of Ganghwa Island, is signed. This treaty mandates the opening of three Korean ports to Japanese trade and the granting of rights to Japanese citizens in Korea that has previously been reserved for westerners, such as extraterritoriality.

Commodore Matthew Perry uses "gunboat diplomacy" to open up Japan's ports to trade with the United States.This gradual opening to the West brings on a surge of economic, political, and technological reforms that lead indirectly to the overthrow of the Tokugawa Shogunate and to the return of imperial rule in a period now known as the Meiji Restoration.

Philippines’ approach took China by surprise. Beijing is by no means prepared to settle the South China Sea disputes through legal means. Chinese foreign policy elites are not convinced that the arbitration is about legal contestations between the Philippines and China at all. Many of them firmly believe that Washington has been heavily involved from the beginning, and that Manila initiated the case to provoke and put political pressure on Beijing. These elites point to the coincidental timing of various decisions by the tribunal and U.S. activities in the Asia Pacific. Chinese maritime lawyers claim that there are numerous weaknesses and ...

During a bilateral meeting at the November 18-19 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders’ summit in Manila, Philippine president Benigno Aquino and Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe agreed in principle to negotiate the transfer of defense equipment and technology from the Japan Self-Defense Forces to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). If completed, this accord would be Japan’s first defense agreement with an Asian country. More significantly, it is an indication that both countries are determined to pursue a strategic partnership in the face of China’s growing assertiveness in Asia.

On 8 December 2008, two Chinese MLE vessels entered waters around the Senkaku Islands, the front line of territorial disputes between Japan and China, for the first time. Since then, China has regularly dispatched MLE vessels to challenge Japan’s effective control over the islands, claiming sovereignty over them as part of the so-called “salami-slice strategy,” a steady progression of small actions with hidden long-term motives.

During the course of my recent discussions with Vietnamese interlocutors, one question has recurred: after a period of prolonged quiet in Vietnam-China relations in the South China Sea (SCS), why has Beijing all of a sudden decided to take a stand at Vanguard Bank? And one could easily further ask why at the same time Beijing opened a new front by conducting a major military exercise at the Paracel Islands? I think there are several components to answering these questions. First, although Vanguard Bank represents the worst Vietnam-China tensions in the SCS since the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig standoff in May ...

The agreements offer both positive and negative lessons. At a minimum, they provide important precedents that should be more widely appreciated – foremost among them that it is possible for China to come to the bargaining table on maritime disputes. Meanwhile specific lessons can be applied to China’s bilateral maritime disputes with Japan, Vietnam, and the Koreas. Unfortunately the Tonkin agreements support only modest expectations for resolution of the complex, multilateral Spratly Islands disputes.

Dr. Michael Green is senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Executive Advisor to AMTI. Gregory Poling is Director of AMTI and Fellow with the Asia Program at CSIS

-(The Diplomat 22/12) The Strategist, the Lawyer and the South China Sea: Understanding law and politics in contested waters. - (Ibtimes 22/12) Japan Spots Armed Chinese Ships Patrolling Senkaku Islands: The sighting is likely to add tension to the already strained Tokyo-Beijing diplomatic relationship, which has suffered as a result of China's claims over island chains and territorial waters in the region. The sighting is likely to add tension to the already strained Tokyo-Beijing diplomatic relationship, which has suffered as a result of China's claims over island chains and territorial waters in the region.