Search result for "claims"

The Female attendants cleaned the city's free may be relegated to the past. The Female attendants cleaned the city's free may be relegated to the past. The Female attendants cleaned the city's free may be relegated to the past. The Female attendants cleaned the city's free may be relegated to the past.

Any country that doesn't make a drastic response to the Chinese claims right from the start, will one day become a victim.

Manipulating public opinion about the nine-dash line figure and enforcing it on the ground does no help in legitimizing China’s controversial claims. Yet, it is a type of information warfare which would have more complicated and long-lasting in China’s own perception and international public opinion.

"Four-Sha" is a lens through which Chinese long-term ambitious claims over the South China Sea is fully exposed. Regardless of the number of “sha”, be it two popular shas, the Paracels or Spratlys, or three as the name of the Sansha city indicates, or four including Pratas and Macclesfield, the long-term ambition of China is to maximise its sovereignty and maritime claims

As it might be difficult for China and the Philippines to defend their official claims over Scarborough as their own territory before the 20th century in an international court, both countries should engage in constructive negotiations over joint development. This is still the best option to avoid deterioration of the conflict for now and the years to come.

The submission by Malaysia represents a positive step forward for coastal states in the SCS to clarify their claims and seriously discuss maritime delimitation in accordance with UNCLOS and the interpretation of its article 121 (3) by the 2016 Tribunal Award.

As Vietnam stands its ground and attests to the legitimacy of its claims in public, the ball is in Beijing’s court to decide whether China wants to be a responsible emerging power.

During the course of my recent discussions with Vietnamese interlocutors, one question has recurred: after a period of prolonged quiet in Vietnam-China relations in the South China Sea (SCS), why has Beijing all of a sudden decided to take a stand at Vanguard Bank? And one could easily further ask why at the same time Beijing opened a new front by conducting a major military exercise at the Paracel Islands? I think there are several components to answering these questions. First, although Vanguard Bank represents the worst Vietnam-China tensions in the SCS since the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig standoff in May ...

As long as the claimant states continue to stand up to China’s excessive claims and defend their legitimate claims endorsed by the arbitral award, and as long as other states around the world do not turn a blind eye to the situation and continue to voice their objections to activities in violation of international law, the arbitral award could be considered to have impact and not “just a piece of paper”.

Abstract: Recent developments in littoral-Asia underscore the need for nautical ‘good order’. The maritime environment in the Asia-Pacific has deteriorated sharply in recent years amid growing rancor over sovereignty claims in the South China Sea and the East Sea. As disputes have escalated into tit-for-tat actions at sea, including naval posturing and provocative land reclamation, regional states have sought to enhance ‘good order' by attempting to formalize a nautical ‘code of conduct’. Yet, strategic analysts have proffered differing interpretations of maritime ‘good order’. Some view ‘order’ as a metaphor for maritime cooperation, emphasizing the need for consensus in regional governance. Others ...

The Maritime Issues conducted an interview with Bill Hayton, Associate Fellow of Chatham House on May 23, 2017. The interview covered a wide range of issues related to the South China Sea, including the effects of the Arbitral Award, the myths about China's claims and the future of US involvement in the South China Sea.

The decision in July 2016 by a special tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration to dismiss the legitimacy of China’s expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea has raised significant questions about how this issue should be managed in the future. Some have argued that the ruling presents an opportunity for regional states to reset interactions with Beijing by emphasising cooperation over sovereignty claims, while others have underscored its importance as a lever to push back further against Chinese territorial claims in maritime Asia.

The conflicts in the South China Sea have a substantial legal dimension. The disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights are classical subjects of international law. UNCLOS provides a comprehensive framework of international rules on the maritime claims of the riparian States and the use of the South China Sea by nations generally. The compulsory dispute settlement system under the UNCLOS envisages an effective and rule-based process for mitigating and resolving maritime conflicts. 

This session assesses the utility of international law in managing and resolving the South China Sea disputes in the post-award context of the Philippines-China arbitration case at the Arbitration Tribunal set up under Annex VII of the UNCLOS. Arguably the long-awaited award that has surprised most, if not all, international observers has also changed the legal status quo in the South China Sea. What are the implications of the arbitration award for the South China Sea situation going forward? How might the Tribunal’s assessment of evidence, reasoning and conclusion in the Philippines-China case affect the claims of the parties directly involved ...

Most of the disputes in the South China Sea have existed for quite a while. This session examines the activities of claimants and stakeholders throughout history to trace the origin and evolution of the territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Who claims what in the South China Sea and since when? What were the factors driving the claimants’ interests in offshore territories? How have major powers got involved in the South China Sea? How have the courses of their national development influenced the South China Sea coastal countries’ maritime policies? How have maritime aspirations been incorporated into national ...

Introduction On 12 July 2016 the Arbitral Tribunal in in the case between the Philippines and China delivered its Award, following its earlier 29 October 2015 Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility.[1] The Tribunal was constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC),[2] having been initiated by the Philippines.[3] The Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague acted as the registry for the case and venue for hearings.[4] China, for its part, returned the Philippines’ notification of its claims, argued that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, and has rejected the Tribunal’s Award.[5] The ...

The boundary agreement covers only a small area. Though better than envisioned in the original talks, which covered about one third of the maritime space eventually delimited, the roughly 300-mile line eventually established bisects only a small fraction of the disputed area. No official talks about extending the line have been reported,Although the “partial effects” precedent can mitigate that complexity and narrow the scope of disputed zones, the fact remains that China would need to muster significantly greater political courage to even begin talks that might touch upon its “indisputable” sovereignty claims over feat

Domestic objections did not scuttle the deal. Nationalist sentiments ran high in both China and Vietnam after the deal was announced. The four-year lag between the parties’ signing the agreements (2000) and putting them into Although the “partial effects” precedent can mitigate that complexity and narrow the scope of disputed zones, the fact remains that China would need to muster significantly greater political courage to even begin talks that might touch upon its “indisputable” sovereignty claims over features in the South and East China Seas.

The agreement gave partial effect to islands and reduced maritime entitlements. The states’ overlapping EEZs in the area were given less than the maximum 200 nautical miles prescribed in UNCLOS. Further, Vietnam’s Bach Long Vi and Con Co Islands were given 25 percent and 50 percent effectAlthough the “partial effects” precedent can mitigate that complexity and narrow the scope of disputed zones, the fact remains that China would need to muster significantly greater political courage to even begin talks that might touch upon its “indisputable” sovereignty claims over features in the South and East China Seas.

China has been deliberately ambiguous about its claims to waters in the South China Sea. Although it has not specified exactly what its claim is around each of the built-up rocks or low-tide elevations in the Spratlys, China’s 1992 law on the territorial sea claims 12-nautical-mile territorial waters from all Chinese territory without distinction. In addition, the Chinese foreign ministry has implied that China claims territorial sovereignty over waters and airspace surrounding submerged reefs. In a statement on October 9, a foreign ministry spokesperson said that China does not “condone infringement of China’s territorial sea and airspace by any 

The U.S. government takes no position on the territorial disputes in the Spratly Islands, but does take a strong position on what kinds of claims are made to the waters surrounding those features. The United States shares the concerns of regional states that the intentional ambiguity of China’s claims to vast stretches of water and seabed are a leading driver of tensions in the South China Sea. U.S. 

The U.S. government takes no position on the territorial disputes in the Spratly Islands, but does take a strong position on what kinds of claims are made to the waters surrounding those features. The United States shares the concerns of regional states that the intentional ambiguity of China’s claims to vast stretches of water and seabed are a leading driver of tensions in the South China Sea. U.S. 

-(The Diplomat 22/12) The Strategist, the Lawyer and the South China Sea: Understanding law and politics in contested waters. - (Ibtimes 22/12) Japan Spots Armed Chinese Ships Patrolling Senkaku Islands: The sighting is likely to add tension to the already strained Tokyo-Beijing diplomatic relationship, which has suffered as a result of China's claims over island chains and territorial waters in the region. The sighting is likely to add tension to the already strained Tokyo-Beijing diplomatic relationship, which has suffered as a result of China's claims over island chains and territorial waters in the region.