Search result for "South China Sea"

The South China Sea is one of the most important maritime communications in the world, connecting the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. About 50,000 merchant ships and nearly 50% of oil tankers of the world pass through the South China Sea every year. Under the current very complicated and turbulent international situation, if the peace and stability in the South China Sea can be maintained, the development and prosperity of East Asia-Pacific region can be realized.

While Southeast Asia has been looking for the post-pandemic recovery the regional strategic situation continues to be defined by the rising tensions of big powers, primarily of China and the USA. These tensions are not new and emerge from the pre-pandemic years of growing regional complexity and conflicting visions of the regional order. With this international context in mind the paper aims to assess the South China Sea as a two-level problem. The dynamics at the first level is mainly defined by the ASEAN member states and at the second one – by China and the USA.  

The 14th South China Sea International Conference titled "Peaceful Sea – Solid Recovery" is expected to be an unique opportunity for participants to comprehensively analyze the state of affairs of the South China Sea and discuss measures to promote maritime cooperation and explore pathways toward the enhancement of security and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific.

This short paper seeks to highlight key updates on naval developments in the SCS since the start of COVID-19. But why specifically “naval” when coastguards appear to be on the front page of recent incidents in the disputed waters? The key development of concern here is how the PLA Navy has become a more assertive actor in Beijing’s quest to push its maritime sovereignty and rights in the SCS. The Southern Theater Command Navy is tasked with both SCS sovereignty and rights protection, and covering Taiwan in times of war. In recent times, this fleet has become a focus of attention for ...

The paper analyzes the intersection of three key currents in Asian geopolitics, namely (i) the emergence Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a fulcrum of pan-regional integration, (ii) the evolution of South China Sea disputes as the preeminent geopolitical conflict of the 21st century, if not the site of the next great war; and, (iii) full commencement of the New Cold War between the United States (US) and China, dispensing with four decades of ‘constructive engagement’ vis-à-vis Beijing. Once seen as the harbinger of an open, inclusive and multilateralist order in the Asia-Pacific, the ASEAN has struggled to assert its ...

South China Sea is the subject of interests far beyond the littoral states, for what happens in the South China Sea would have deep consequences elsewhere. Most states also clearly indicate preference to lawfare to other means of contestation, because a rules-based Indo-Pacific is in the interests of all.

The South China Sea Arbitral Award has now become an important part of our history and our present as well as an undeniable fact. It is conceivable that this Award will also continue to be a helpful guide leading the concerned parties to develop a viable rules-based order in the South China Sea, rather than allowing the region to become a 'might makes right’ arena for interstate rivalry.

Major power competition, particularly the growing Sino-US multi-faceted rivalry characterized global politics in 2020. The South China Sea featured prominently in this rivalry in 2020.

Germany's plan to deploy naval ship in the Indo-Pacific does not change its neutral position in the South China Sea dispute, is a careful practice of international law, and therefore will not erode regional stability nor any littoral country's sovereignty as China might have suggested.

China recently announced that it had successfully cultivated vegetables on Woody Island to meet food demand. But this crop serves more than a nutritional purpose.

Any country that doesn't make a drastic response to the Chinese claims right from the start, will one day become a victim.

Manipulating public opinion about the nine-dash line figure and enforcing it on the ground does no help in legitimizing China’s controversial claims. Yet, it is a type of information warfare which would have more complicated and long-lasting in China’s own perception and international public opinion.

The US communication added a voice to the common position of Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia on consideration of UNCLOS as the sole legal basis for defining, in a comprehensive and exhaustive manner, the scope of their respective maritime entitlements in the South China Sea.

The 2019 Malaysian partial submission renewed the legal exchanges over the South China Sea. Most of the claimants, except China and Brunei, through their statements and actions, expressed acceptance and support for the 2016 Tribunal Award. The legal status of South China Sea features will depend on the legal battle that has been triggered rather than with coercions or the use of force.  

The submission by Malaysia represents a positive step forward for coastal states in the SCS to clarify their claims and seriously discuss maritime delimitation in accordance with UNCLOS and the interpretation of its article 121 (3) by the 2016 Tribunal Award.

The 11th South China Sea International Conference is an ambitious congregation armed with 6 plenaries and 6 roundtables. It includes 51 prominent speakers from 20 countries and territories, and a number of important keynote addresses by senior officials and leading experts. 280 participants, including 17 ambassadors and head of representative office, have registed to attend the conference.

As Vietnam stands its ground and attests to the legitimacy of its claims in public, the ball is in Beijing’s court to decide whether China wants to be a responsible emerging power.

During the course of my recent discussions with Vietnamese interlocutors, one question has recurred: after a period of prolonged quiet in Vietnam-China relations in the South China Sea (SCS), why has Beijing all of a sudden decided to take a stand at Vanguard Bank? And one could easily further ask why at the same time Beijing opened a new front by conducting a major military exercise at the Paracel Islands? I think there are several components to answering these questions. First, although Vanguard Bank represents the worst Vietnam-China tensions in the SCS since the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig standoff in May ...

As long as the claimant states continue to stand up to China’s excessive claims and defend their legitimate claims endorsed by the arbitral award, and as long as other states around the world do not turn a blind eye to the situation and continue to voice their objections to activities in violation of international law, the arbitral award could be considered to have impact and not “just a piece of paper”.

“The size of China’s displacement of the world balance is such that the world must find a new balance,” warned the late Singaporean leader Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. “It is not possible to pretend that this is just another big player. This is the biggest player in the history of the world.”

In a snap shot, while China can gain some ground in short term by flexing its muscle, it would risk greater backlash from its neighbors and collective actions from the international community in the long run. China should not interpret regional countries’ patience and restraint as signs of weakness and accommodation but gestures of goodwill to prompt second, constructive thinking. After all, its unlawful activities will soon meet up with resistance from directly involved nations. Futhermore, overplaying its hand would eventually prompt strategic realignments across the board to weaken its power foundation.

Gray zone tactics have fundamentally changed the operational environment in which the United States and Asian maritime countries operate. Yet these countries remain in the early stages of developing approaches that will better enable them to credibly deter Chinese coercion.

The only way for a Joint Development Agreement to push through is that Duterte would manage to amend the Philippine constitution, largely ignore his country’s arbitration award victory, and overcome deep-seated public antipathy towards resource-sharing agreements with China.  

Malaysia’s approach on South China Sea under Mahathir may provide additional gain for ASEAN collectively, now that Malaysia can provide a strong voice in dealing with China on pushing for a legally binding COC.

The Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV), the Foundation for East Sea Studies (FESS), and the Vietnam Lawyers’ Association (VLA) are pleased to host the 10th South China Sea International Conference: “Cooperation for Regional Security and Development” on November 8-9, 2018 in Da Nang, Viet Nam.  

East Asia is a huge seascape. As a result, the sea’s connecting power is of a priceless importance to the entire region. The rules-based international maritime order is in everyone’s interest, including Japan.

The South China Sea is not nearing resolution, nor has it been “lost”. Instead, the “conundrum” is moving into a different and more difficult phase.

While much of the day-to-day work of managing U.S. diplomatic, economic, and security interactions in Asia seems to have continued unchanged, this belies a very significant difference in the Trump Administration’s apparent view of how the United States should engage with the world.

Philippine policy on the South China Sea under Duterte is clearly still evolving, and efforts to seek a correct balance between a principled nationalist stand and more pragmatic objectives are bound to encounter many tests.

The 9th South China Sea International Conference: “Cooperation for Regional Security and Development” hosted by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV), the Foundation for East Sea Studies (FESS) and the Vietnam Lawyers’ Association (VLA) took place at Ho Chi Minh City on 27-28 November, 2017.  

Washington should think beyond the dyad of balancing and appeasement. The struggle for a rule-based order in South China Sea is enduring and comprehensive, which requires greater persistence and stronger engagements on the part of the US and other regional countries. 

The Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV), the Foundation for East Sea Studies (FESS) and the Vietnam Lawyers’ Association (VLA) are pleased to host the 9th South China Sea International Conference: “Cooperation for Regional Security and Development” on 27-28 November 2017 in Ho Chi Minh City, Viet Nam.

Robert Haddick’s “Fire on the Water: China, America and the Future of the Pacific” gives readers in-depth knowledge of the present strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific and the dilemma that the status quo superpower is facing over there.   

The Maritime Issues conducts a conversation with Southeast Asia-based experts on issues related to a Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea

If the past is prologue, China’s disregard for the Award and its continual militarization of its features in the South China Sea means that ASEAN’s Long March for a COC will remain a protracted one.

Although the South China Sea award has brough much clarity to the scope of the disputes and opened possibilities for peaceful dispute management, the situation in the South China Sea in the past year tends to tell a different story.  

A key focal point of discussions at the June 2017 Shangri-La Dialogue (Security Summit) in Singapore was China and its actions in the South China Sea. Both the opening keynote address and the first two plenary sessions implicitly and/or explicitly responded to Beijing’s construction and militarisation of artificial islands in the area and, for this purpose, placed a significant amount of emphasis on the need to maintain a rules-based order. 

The Arbitral Tribunal’s ruling has changed the situation in the South China Sea in unexpected ways.

Over the last few years the South China Sea (SCS) dispute has become a chief point of friction between Beijing and Washington, causing widespread apprehensions of an emerging Sino–US rivalry that could unsettle the long peace and stability that the region has enjoyed since the 1970s. While there have long been differences between the two countries in their positions in the SCS – and unlike issues such as Taiwan, Tibet, and even trade disputes until recently – the SCS dispute has never assumed such a central place in the bilateral relationship as it is today.

The desire to see Chinese diplomatic softening as a sign of a new status quo is understandable, and it is important that the door be left open for Beijing to deescalate. But China’s recent behavior should be seen as the best indicator of its future intentions.

The decision in July 2016 by a special tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration to dismiss the legitimacy of China’s expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea has raised significant questions about how this issue should be managed in the future. Some have argued that the ruling presents an opportunity for regional states to reset interactions with Beijing by emphasising cooperation over sovereignty claims, while others have underscored its importance as a lever to push back further against Chinese territorial claims in maritime Asia.

However vocally supportive Canberra is of the United States in the South China Sea, in an operational sense Australia has held back since Washington began its current freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs), in October 2015, shortly after Malcolm Turnbull took over as Prime Minister. Why is that so? 

The conflicts in the South China Sea have a substantial legal dimension. The disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights are classical subjects of international law. UNCLOS provides a comprehensive framework of international rules on the maritime claims of the riparian States and the use of the South China Sea by nations generally. The compulsory dispute settlement system under the UNCLOS envisages an effective and rule-based process for mitigating and resolving maritime conflicts. 

The great geostrategist Nicholas Spykman once described the South China Sea as the ‘Asiatic Mediterranean’ to emphasise its importance in Asian geopolitics. Just as the Roman Empire sought control over the Mediterranean and the United States over the Caribbean in pursuit of regional dominance, China seeks dominance over the South China Sea, making it a ‘Chinese Caribbean.’

Chinese actions in the South China Sea (SCS) have been closely observed by analysts in recent years. Many incidents indicate the implementation of a strategy for the expansion of Chinese control over the disputed waters. These include clashes involving fishing and coast guard vessels; activities such as large-scale dredging and land reclamation; and proclamations of Chinese sovereignty over the entire ‘Nine-Dash Line’ area.

Over the last few years the South China Sea dispute has become a chief point of friction between Beijing and Washington, causing widespread apprehensions of an emerging Sino–US rivalry that could unsettle the long peace and stability that the region has enjoyed since the 1970s. While there have long been differences between the two countries in their positions in the SCS – and unlike issues such as Taiwan, Tibet, and even trade disputes until recently – the SCS dispute has never assumed such a central place in the bilateral relationship as it is today. 

The South China Sea persists as the leading security and development challenge for Vietnam. In Hanoi’s view, the situation in the South China Sea affects almost all aspects of national security and development: protecting territorial integrity and national sovereignty; promoting maritime economic development; maintaining an external peaceful environment and, in particular, peaceful relationships with China and other claimants; and safeguarding regime legitimacy and internal stability.

A central task of the rules-based international order is to address disputes equitably between states without resorting to force or coercion. This task is especially important when disputes involve states with stark power imbalances. In these cases the temptation to pressure and coerce may be especially alluring, as the example of Thucydides’ unfortunate Melians demonstrates. 

The nations surrounding the South China Sea (SCS) now constitute a leading consumer of arms, and increasingly some of the most modern and most advanced armaments are finding their way into the inventories of Asian militaries. As a result, many Asian-Pacific militaries have experienced a significant, if not unprecedented, build-up over the past several years, in terms of quantity and quality.

East and Southeast Asia have seen considerable economic growth over the past few decades. The pace of development in China has been virtually unprecedented, with millions of people being raised above severe poverty to a middle-class lifestyle. This outcome has resulted from national investments in human capital and infrastructure and policies that have encouraged business growth and trade. 

Since 2015, this annual South China Sea Conference series has initiated the Young Leaders Program, which has attracted a dozen of bright young scholars and PhD candidates from many countries to come and discuss ways to foster cooperation in the South China Sea. Young Leaders Program has two main objectives: (i) getting fresh views from young scholars on how to manage disputes in the South China Sea; and (ii) engaging and building research interests of new generation of scholars on maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Representative of the Young Leaders group will present the group's discussion and their views on ...

There are already a number of mechanisms in place for managing the South China Sea tensions. While these mechanisms in some extent managed to prevent tensions from escalating into conflicts, most are perceived as having overlapping functions. Besides, there are legitimate complaints that gaps still exist and that a number of global and regional institutions have not yet fully or partly utilized. At the same time, international good practices in semi-closed seas have not been fully explored for potential application in the South China Sea. This session examines the current state of regional security structures in dealing with South China Sea ...

As the South China Sea becomes a theatre for big power rivalry, there is a need to explore strategic policies of related powers and relations among them. It is worth investigating which factors have driven big powers’ maritime strategies and how they have perceived one another’s actions. What are these powers’ goals in the South China Sea, greater security or greater power? Are there any misperceptions or security dilemmas between claimants and between big powers? In view of rising tensions in the South China Sea, it is important to study how ASEAN has handled the maritime affairs and how the South ...

This session explores critical economic and environmental issues in the South China Sea. A range of factors have impacted on the political economy of the South China Sea, including the falling price of energy, the depletion of fish stocks, and substantial environmental degradation caused by human activities. Pertinent to the discussion on these issues are analyses of regional countries’ development plans and foreign policy agendas, most notably China’s Maritime Silk Road initiative. The session examines how the need for improved infrastructure, access to maritime resources and commons, and legal obligations to cooperation for environmental protection have affected the resolution and management ...

Over the last eight years, the series of the annual South China Sea Conferences organised by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, Vietnam Lawyers Association, and Foundation for East Sea Studies (FESS) has contributed greatly to the scholarship on the South China Sea. 

This session assesses the utility of international law in managing and resolving the South China Sea disputes in the post-award context of the Philippines-China arbitration case at the Arbitration Tribunal set up under Annex VII of the UNCLOS. Arguably the long-awaited award that has surprised most, if not all, international observers has also changed the legal status quo in the South China Sea. What are the implications of the arbitration award for the South China Sea situation going forward? How might the Tribunal’s assessment of evidence, reasoning and conclusion in the Philippines-China case affect the claims of the parties directly involved ...

2016 has witnessed significant changes to the status quo in the South China Sea region, strategically and legally speaking. This session takes stock of the rhetoric and actions of the claimants and other relevant stakeholders with a view to mapping out continuity and changes in these countries’ policies and the dynamics of interactions between them that have shaped the current state of affairs as well as the possible contours of things in the future. Based on discussions of recent developments in the South China Sea, speakers are expected to identify general trends in the South China Sea situation in 2017 and ...

Most of the disputes in the South China Sea have existed for quite a while. This session examines the activities of claimants and stakeholders throughout history to trace the origin and evolution of the territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Who claims what in the South China Sea and since when? What were the factors driving the claimants’ interests in offshore territories? How have major powers got involved in the South China Sea? How have the courses of their national development influenced the South China Sea coastal countries’ maritime policies? How have maritime aspirations been incorporated into national ...

On July 12, 2016, an award in the arbitration case between the Philippines and China over the South China Sea was announced, which denied China’s “historic rights” in the South China Sea. As the award was released by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague, the media reported that the PCA “ruled” the case, describing the award as a “PCA ruling.”  

The Maritime Issues conducts an interview with Kavi Chongkittavorn, a veteran ASEAN watcher who is a senior fellow at the Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University (Thailand) on all issues related to ASEAN and its South China Sea agenda.   

SESSION 6: Challenges and Implications for Conflict Mitigation and/or Dispute Resolution

SESSION 5: International Law, UNCLOS and the Arbitral Tribunal Determination: Retrospect and Prospects

SESSION 4: National interests and the Role of Major and Middle Powers in the SCS

SESSION 3: The SCS and China-US Relations: A Case of Great Power Rivalry, Reluctant Entanglement and/or Strategic Exaggeration?

SESSION 2: Critical security and economic dilemmas for Southeast Asia in the South China Sea

Introduction On 12 July 2016 the Arbitral Tribunal in in the case between the Philippines and China delivered its Award, following its earlier 29 October 2015 Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility.[1] The Tribunal was constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC),[2] having been initiated by the Philippines.[3] The Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague acted as the registry for the case and venue for hearings.[4] China, for its part, returned the Philippines’ notification of its claims, argued that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, and has rejected the Tribunal’s Award.[5] The ...

Critical Security and Economic Dilemmas for Southeast Asia in the South China Sea: A Philippine Perspective 

Signs that China may be contemplating another bout of island-building in the South China Sea ahead of an important U.N. ruling on the issue have provoked the United States to step up its vigilance in the region in recent days.

The Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV), Foundation for East Sea Studies (FESS) and the Vietnam Lawyers’ Association (VLA) are pleased to host the 7th South China Sea International Conference: “Cooperation for Regional Security and Development” on 23-24 November 2015 in Vung Tau city, Viet Nam.

The Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV), Foundation for East Sea Studies (FESS) and the Vietnam Lawyers’ Association (VLA) are pleased to host the 7th South China Sea International Conference: “Cooperation for Regional Security and Development” on 23-24 November 2015 in Vung Tau city, Viet Nam.

The long-awaited Tribunal’s merits ruling will come soon. What happens then? In Part 1, I examined Chinese legal opinions regarding the Philippines-initiated arbitration case against China’s expansive nine-dash line (NDL) claim in the South China Sea (SCS). In short, the intent of Beijing’s legal position paper on the Philippine case at the International Tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in was to ensure the Tribunal judges ask the “right” (meaning “favorable”) questions in their deliberations. Beijing’s goal was to indirectly challenge the merits of the case without formally doing so — which would imply acknowledgment of the PCA’s jurisdiction.

China’s foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang criticized the exercise, saying the U.S. Navy ship “illegally entered” the waters near the islands “without receiving permission from the Chinese government,” “threatened China’s sovereignty and security interests,” and “endangered regional peace and stability.”

PRC dredgers have created a land mass that spans the entire existing reef and is approximately 3,000 meters long and 200-300 meters wide. China is currently building an airstrip with an estimated final length of 3,110 meters, long enough to allow any PRC military aircraft to land. AMTI has obtained and released the first publicly available photos of this airstrip development. China has also begun development of port facilities which may be capable of docking military tankers. What will the implications of this development be for the region?

orem Ipsum is simply dummy text of the printing and typesetting industry. Lorem Ipsum has been the industry's standard dummy text ever since the 1500s, when an unknown printer took a galley of type and scrambled it to make a type specimen book. It has survived not only five centuries, but 

This presentation will focus on two separate and distinct minilateral institutions – the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue Forum (Quad) and AUKUS. The Quad and AUKUS share the same genesis: an impelling strategic concern among their members about the economic and military rise of China in the Indo-Pacific where China has spread its influence primarily through diplomatic, political and economic inducements accompanied by intimidation and coercion in the South China Sea. This presentation will discuss whether these two institutions challenge or reinforce ASEAN’s efforts to promote maritime cooperation.

This year marks the 20th anniversary of the signing of the DOC, a special year for China and ASEAN countries who are committed to peace and stability as well as maritime cooperation in the South China Sea. Taking this as an opportunity, they need to review their experience and learn lessons. Starting with building consensus and enhancing mutual trust, they need to focus on new ideas and new paths and, guided by win-win cooperation, write a new chapter on maritime cooperation and ocean governance in the South China Sea. 

Promoting marine renewable energy (MRE) and implementation of Emission Control Areas (ECAs) are some of the measures which can be adopted by countries in the Indian Ocean Region and the South China Sea to promote maritime sustainability. Financing sustainable maritime development is also critical for implementing Blue Economy and ‘debt for nature swaps’ provide an innovative financing mechanism to fund sustainable development in the maritime domain.

The protection of marine environment and ensuring the ocean’s sustainability are global issues.  Nowhere are they more important than in the South China Sea, a body of water offering abundant and complex marine ecosystems. Marine citizen science, along with the promise of data sharing and the adoption of the newest technologies, provide pathways to addressing the ocean conservation process, supporting collective and cooperative action and informing policy and public understanding of key environmental issues.  

Suggestions for lasting peace in the South China Sea and beyond need to incorporate small and medium states as well

"Four-Sha" is a lens through which Chinese long-term ambitious claims over the South China Sea is fully exposed. Regardless of the number of “sha”, be it two popular shas, the Paracels or Spratlys, or three as the name of the Sansha city indicates, or four including Pratas and Macclesfield, the long-term ambition of China is to maximise its sovereignty and maritime claims

Though recent allegations raise more questions than they provide answers, they should reinforce the need for greater transparency in the South China Sea.

By diversifying its diplomatic engagement with Manila and coordinating military resources and strategy, the U.S. can reject China’s revisionist changes in the South China Sea

As history has shown, appeasement begets more aggression if the aggressor knows no bounds for its action. If anything, Vanguard Bank should not become Sudetenland of South China Sea.

Too often analysts of the South China Sea disputes tend to treat them as somewhat abstract debates over different modes of global governance. We also need to see them as a clear and present danger to the livelihoods and standards of living of millions of people.

There is no easy solution to the territorial dispute in the South China Sea, but boosting nationalism to the point of extremeness is not the answer

Abstract: Recent developments in littoral-Asia underscore the need for nautical ‘good order’. The maritime environment in the Asia-Pacific has deteriorated sharply in recent years amid growing rancor over sovereignty claims in the South China Sea and the East Sea. As disputes have escalated into tit-for-tat actions at sea, including naval posturing and provocative land reclamation, regional states have sought to enhance ‘good order' by attempting to formalize a nautical ‘code of conduct’. Yet, strategic analysts have proffered differing interpretations of maritime ‘good order’. Some view ‘order’ as a metaphor for maritime cooperation, emphasizing the need for consensus in regional governance. Others ...

As the world turns its attention from Chinese militarization of the South China Sea islets to North Korean nuclear and missile provocations, China is making every effort to establish a “new normal” in the East China Sea with more frequent military and paramilitary presence and more offshore gas platforms construction there. 

The Maritime Issues conducted an interview with Bill Hayton, Associate Fellow of Chatham House on May 23, 2017. The interview covered a wide range of issues related to the South China Sea, including the effects of the Arbitral Award, the myths about China's claims and the future of US involvement in the South China Sea.

The possibility of standoffs among the Spratly disputants and especially between China and the US may have increased with the ruling of the Arbitral Tribunal on 12 July 2016. The award has invalidated Beijing’s basis for Spratly patrols based on the nine-dotted line. At the same time it lends America new ground for Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea (SCS). These are part of the reason for Beijing to reject the arbitration award.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has sought to address the challenges of the disputes in the South China Sea for close to a quarter of a century. This paper examines the circumstances and extent to which ASEAN has been effective in its response to the South China Sea dispute as well as the manner and means by which Beijing’s approach to the dispute has been influenced at the regional level.

For a considerable time now efforts to manage disputes and promote cooperation in the South China Sea have been inhibited by the lack of an equitably defined geography of disputed and non-disputed maritime zones in the South China Sea. The Award rendered by the Tribunal on 12 July 2016 in the so-called South China Sea arbitration initiated by the Philippines against China has put an end to that situation, thus opening up new cooperation opportunities for states in the region. 

This article primarily looks at the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to give content to the notions of maritime cooperation and ocean governance. It indicates certain areas of tension and specifically focusses on the South China Sea in general, and Indonesia more in particular.  

This session focuses on the interactions and coordination between various forces operating in the South China Sea, including naval, air and law enforcement forces of claimant and user states of the sea. Speakers are asked to address operational and legal issues and rules of engagement (ROE), as well as questions on how to avoid and manage incidents and how to promote information sharing and cooperation in dealing with maritime threats in the South China Sea. They are also expected to explore ideas and suggestions on practical measures for regional stakeholders to utilize in order to avoid and manage incidents that might ...

For China, naval strategy is a means to force the US to adjust its geopolitical position in the Western Pacific to accommodate its rise.  The Chinese intention is to edge the US out of the Western Pacific and to dislodge it from its current forward military presence, leaving the South China Sea and Taiwan to a Chinese sphere of influence. 

After months of internal debate within the Obama administration, the guided missile destroyer USS Lassentransited within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef, one of China’s artificially-built features in the South China Sea, on October 27 in what is termed a “freedom of navigation” (FON) operation. It was accompanied by two maritime surveillance aircraft, a P-8A Poseidon and a P-3 Orion.

China has been deliberately ambiguous about its claims to waters in the South China Sea. Although it has not specified exactly what its claim is around each of the built-up rocks or low-tide elevations in the Spratlys, China’s 1992 law on the territorial sea claims 12-nautical-mile territorial waters from all Chinese territory without distinction. In addition, the Chinese foreign ministry has implied that China claims territorial sovereignty over waters and airspace surrounding submerged reefs. In a statement on October 9, a foreign ministry spokesperson said that China does not “condone infringement of China’s territorial sea and airspace by any 

The U.S. government takes no position on the territorial disputes in the Spratly Islands, but does take a strong position on what kinds of claims are made to the waters surrounding those features. The United States shares the concerns of regional states that the intentional ambiguity of China’s claims to vast stretches of water and seabed are a leading driver of tensions in the South China Sea. U.S. 

The U.S. government takes no position on the territorial disputes in the Spratly Islands, but does take a strong position on what kinds of claims are made to the waters surrounding those features. The United States shares the concerns of regional states that the intentional ambiguity of China’s claims to vast stretches of water and seabed are a leading driver of tensions in the South China Sea. U.S. 

FON operations are not primarily about military deterrence or diplomatic messaging, though in a politically charged atmosphere like the South China Sea those play a role. At its root, FON operations are legal exercises to reinforce the United States’—and in this case the overwhelming majority of the international community’s—interpretations of international maritime law. T

After months of internal debate within the Obama administration, the guided missile destroyer USS Lassentransited within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef, one of China’s artificially-built features in the South China Sea, on October 27 in what is termed a “freedom of navigation” (FON) operation. It was accompanied by two maritime surveillance aircraft, a P-8A Poseidon and a P-3 Orion.

Philippines’ approach took China by surprise. Beijing is by no means prepared to settle the South China Sea disputes through legal means. Chinese foreign policy elites are not convinced that the arbitration is about legal contestations between the Philippines and China at all. Many of them firmly believe that Washington has been heavily involved from the beginning, and that Manila initiated the case to provoke and put political pressure on Beijing. These elites point to the coincidental timing of various decisions by the tribunal and U.S. activities in the Asia Pacific. Chinese maritime lawyers claim that there are numerous weaknesses and ...

-(The Diplomat 22/12) The Strategist, the Lawyer and the South China Sea: Understanding law and politics in contested waters. - (Ibtimes 22/12) Japan Spots Armed Chinese Ships Patrolling Senkaku Islands: The sighting is likely to add tension to the already strained Tokyo-Beijing diplomatic relationship, which has suffered as a result of China's claims over island chains and territorial waters in the region. The sighting is likely to add tension to the already strained Tokyo-Beijing diplomatic relationship, which has suffered as a result of China's claims over island chains and territorial waters in the region.

A small plane chartered by a BBC news crew drew a warning from the Chinese navy after it flew near a Chinese-built artificial island in the South China Sea, according to a recent report. A small plane chartered by a BBC news crew drew a warning from the Chinese navy after it flew near a Chinese-built artificial island in the South China Sea, according to a recent report. A small plane chartered by a BBC news crew drew a warning from the Chinese navy after it flew near a Chinese-built artificial island in the South China Sea, according to a recent report.