Search result for "East China Sea"

On 8 December 2008, two Chinese MLE vessels entered waters around the Senkaku Islands, the front line of territorial disputes between Japan and China, for the first time. Since then, China has regularly dispatched MLE vessels to challenge Japan’s effective control over the islands, claiming sovereignty over them as part of the so-called “salami-slice strategy,” a steady progression of small actions with hidden long-term motives.

As the world turns its attention from Chinese militarization of the South China Sea islets to North Korean nuclear and missile provocations, China is making every effort to establish a “new normal” in the East China Sea with more frequent military and paramilitary presence and more offshore gas platforms construction there. 

Recent developments in the East China Sea foreshadow a long-term trend of confrontation between the two great Asian powers which, if not properly managed, could upset regional stability in a catastrophic manner.

China announced its new Coast Guard Law containing worrisome provisions that need further clarification. Japan, a prominent claimant in the East China Sea, feels threatened by this law.  

During the course of my recent discussions with Vietnamese interlocutors, one question has recurred: after a period of prolonged quiet in Vietnam-China relations in the South China Sea (SCS), why has Beijing all of a sudden decided to take a stand at Vanguard Bank? And one could easily further ask why at the same time Beijing opened a new front by conducting a major military exercise at the Paracel Islands? I think there are several components to answering these questions. First, although Vanguard Bank represents the worst Vietnam-China tensions in the SCS since the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig standoff in May ...

Domestic objections did not scuttle the deal. Nationalist sentiments ran high in both China and Vietnam after the deal was announced. The four-year lag between the parties’ signing the agreements (2000) and putting them into Although the “partial effects” precedent can mitigate that complexity and narrow the scope of disputed zones, the fact remains that China would need to muster significantly greater political courage to even begin talks that might touch upon its “indisputable” sovereignty claims over features in the South and East China Seas.

The agreement gave partial effect to islands and reduced maritime entitlements. The states’ overlapping EEZs in the area were given less than the maximum 200 nautical miles prescribed in UNCLOS. Further, Vietnam’s Bach Long Vi and Con Co Islands were given 25 percent and 50 percent effectAlthough the “partial effects” precedent can mitigate that complexity and narrow the scope of disputed zones, the fact remains that China would need to muster significantly greater political courage to even begin talks that might touch upon its “indisputable” sovereignty claims over features in the South and East China Seas.