Convergence and Divergence of Interests surrounding the Management of Maritime Power Projection in and around Southeast Asia: Indonesian Perspective
The impact of the US and China projecting maritime power in Asian security runs along the continuum of low intensity conflict to war. While Southeast Asian states do not really refrain from employing their maritime security forces, including navy, as the primary response to China's actions in the South China Sea, ASEAN places a strong emphasis on diplomatic responses to address the deployment of maritime forces in the region.
By Curie Maharani
September 18, 2023
US and China Project Maritime Power and Its Impact on Southeast Asia’s Security
Southeast Asia lies at the epicentre of the strategic rivalry between the United States and China.[1] The region is particularly sensitive to shifts in power dynamics, as the US's influence declines and China's rise continues. China's economic and military growth has been challenging the US's military dominance in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly so in maritime zones. China's strategic objectives go beyond territorial claims and reunification interests in Taiwan, extending to anti-access and area denial strategies aimed at thwarting potential US intervention in Taiwan-related conflicts.[2] In response, the US has been bolstering its alliances and partnerships with countries in the region, including Thailand and the Philippines, while also engaging in various multilateral efforts through ASEAN, as well as through minilateralism by revitalizing the QUAD and forming AUKUS. The most high-profile response from US has been the Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP)[3], conducted at least 53 times across 2015-2022 period (with 22 operations in 2022 alone[4]), to challenge excessive maritime claims by claimant countries in the South China Sea – especially China.
The impact of the US and China projecting maritime power in Asian security runs along the continuum of low intensity conflict to war. The current maritime flashpoints can be categorised into three: the first is the one that develops between Southeast Asian country and either superpower, the second is conflict between superpowers (and its allies), and the third is the conflict that affect other states as result of “a spillover” of the first type (ASEAN countries)[5].
First, there is a potential for conflicts between ASEAN maritime countries and either China or the US. Over the period from 2012 to 2021, there were 71 maritime incidents, with confrontation being the most prevalent type, followed by violations of sovereign rights, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and illegal trespassing.[6] China was the most active country in these incidents, followed by Indonesia and the US (as result of FONOP). In the South China Sea, China's Coast Guard played a prominent role in these incidents, followed by the navy, other state actors, air force, and survey vessels. This highlights China's ability to project power at sea, enabling it to deploy various state actors to multiple disputed areas simultaneously through grey zone strategy. While Chinese actors tended to employ non-violent approaches in dealing with these incidents, there is tendency toward assertiveness and use of violence in creative ways (i.e. pointing military grade laser to Philippines vessel). Indonesia takes note of this development and formulates a whole-government approach to overcome silo mentality of its maritime security actors. US maritime projection, while seems to carry more benign intention, can still result in the perception of violation. Recently, the Indonesian TNI commander named the US as country with most violations to Indonesian airspace, especially its military plane. [7]
Second, in addition to Taiwan, the South China Sea has become a potential flashpoint for a direct confrontation between the two giants. US’ Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the region have led to increased tensions, especially with China.[8] FONOPs is a controversial tactic, even within the US coalition, as it can be risky if not executed by experienced sailors[9] and the majority of these operations involve the use of destroyers. Between 2015-2021, the Paracel Islands (18 times) and the Spratly Islands (15 times) were the most targeted areas for FONOPs.
Third, there is a concern about an arms race in the region that fuels instability, with smaller countries potentially getting caught in the line of fire. This concern is particularly significant in the context of AUKUS. While the main deal is to provide nuclear-powered submarines to Australia by the late 2030s/early 2040s, the US and UK also plan to station their nuclear submarines in Australia. In the case of future war, possibility of Australia’s involvement and the use of its military base to launch attack means Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Philippines, under international law, must allow its sea lane to be accessed by warships. Different standing present different challenges and soul-searching for ASEAN member countries. Indonesia as a neutral party, must ponder a way to pursue capability to deny power projection of belligerent through its airspace. On the other hand, Singapore and Philippines, with special logistics arrangement with the US, need to have a deep reflection on the implication of allowing its territory and infrastructure to be used by the warring parties during the war. Similar soul-searching needs to be undertaken by Cambodia, which has a special arrangement with China for the logistical support of its aircraft carrier.
Divergence and Convergence in Southeast Asia Countries in Response to Maritime Power Projection
Southeast Asia is defined by its diversity, encompassing various aspects such as ethnicity, cultures, religion, geography, economies, politics, and external influences. This diversity is a key factor contributing to ASEAN's challenges in achieving coherence and a shared sense of purpose.[10] Some ASEAN members see the rising trend of maritime power projection as threats, while some others have different perceptions and priorities. Militarisation of the South China Sea by China, as well as several incidents occurring in the disputed areas, are seen as a strategic challenge by claimant countries and to some extent for Indonesia - whose Natuna Sea has been claimed as part of Chinese nine dash line. Especially so for Philippines and Vietnam that have tasted first headedly China’s blockage and harassment in the disputed area.[11] On the other hand, announcement of AUKUS in 2012 served as the other test of history by separating those who welcome the partnership - such as Singapore, Philippines, and Vietnam - from others that cautiously scrutinise the idea - such as Indonesia and Malaysia. [12] Initially, there were concerns about the potential for an arms race and conflict escalation. However, Indonesia has come to accept the reality that minilateralism initiatives like AUKUS cannot be easily stifled. Instead, Indonesia emphasizes the importance of proceeding with transparency in such endeavours.
There has been concern about ASEAN’s sense of urgency and level of consensus when it comes it maritime security concerns, especially with the organisation’s responses to the unfolding of maritime conflict in the South China Sea. Huang, using discourse analysis of ASEAN Summit Statements 2012-2018, found the inconsistency in the way the summit responds to dynamics in the South China Sea and that ASEAN fail to maintain high-level of consensus.[13] For example, In the ASEAN Summit held in May 2014, ASEAN made a strong statement about respecting freedom of navigation and overflight above the South China Sea, following China’s activities in the contested area of Vietnam EEZ. The next Summit, that took place in November 2014, failed to rally a collective approach to press for further concession or adjustment from China. The inconsistent patterns continued until today.
Only a limited number of Southeast Asian leaders seem willing to make the necessary expensive domestic and economic sacrifices for substantial and long-term investments in offensive military capabilities. Economic slowdown and domestic issues affect the progress of defence modernisation and cooperation in the region. Out of seven countries, that is Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Vietnam, only two (Philippines and Thailand) recorded an increase in arms import in the last five years compared to half a decade before.
While Southeast Asian states do not really refrain from employing their maritime security forces, including navy, as the primary response to China's actions in the South China Sea, ASEAN places a strong emphasis on diplomatic responses to address the deployment of maritime forces in the region. The aim is to pursue conflict management without resorting to formal sanctions or threats (who have the power in ASEAN to execute sanction anyway). The ASEAN Indo-Pacific Outlook document underscores the importance of non-violent approaches to problem-solving and multilateralism. Additionally, ASEAN seeks to achieve a balance by engaging middle power countries, like France and India to sign Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ), in addition to traditional partners like Japan, South Korea, and Australia, as part of its norms-setting agenda. The US is not the only balancer in the region, as their calls for outright balancing against China's rise are viewed as more aligned with the long-term concerns and strategies of the US to maintain its position in the region, rather than reflecting the immediate security concerns of ASEAN member states. ASEAN rebalancing with other middle power is also inevitable, considering the decline of Russia as the region’s no. 1 arms supplier, will affect the region in two ways: (1) it reduce the readiness of military that operate their weapon systems, such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia; (2) it force Southeast Asia that rely on Russia as counterbalance against China, to find an alternative partner who can fill Russian shoes. Questions remains whether ASEAN can go beyond norms setting, especially in the brink of open conflict between superpowers.
Curie Maharani, a lecturer for the streaming of Conflict and Security Studies at Binus University, Jakarta, Indonesia
Southeast Asia lies at the epicentre of the strategic rivalry between the United States and China.[1] The region is particularly sensitive to shifts in power dynamics, as the US's influence declines and China's rise continues. China's economic and military growth has been challenging the US's military dominance in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly so in maritime zones. China's strategic objectives go beyond territorial claims and reunification interests in Taiwan, extending to anti-access and area denial strategies aimed at thwarting potential US intervention in Taiwan-related conflicts.[2] In response, the US has been bolstering its alliances and partnerships with countries in the region, including Thailand and the Philippines, while also engaging in various multilateral efforts through ASEAN, as well as through minilateralism by revitalizing the QUAD and forming AUKUS. The most high-profile response from US has been the Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP)[3], conducted at least 53 times across 2015-2022 period (with 22 operations in 2022 alone[4]), to challenge excessive maritime claims by claimant countries in the South China Sea – especially China.
The impact of the US and China projecting maritime power in Asian security runs along the continuum of low intensity conflict to war. The current maritime flashpoints can be categorised into three: the first is the one that develops between Southeast Asian country and either superpower, the second is conflict between superpowers (and its allies), and the third is the conflict that affect other states as result of “a spillover” of the first type (ASEAN countries)[5].
First, there is a potential for conflicts between ASEAN maritime countries and either China or the US. Over the period from 2012 to 2021, there were 71 maritime incidents, with confrontation being the most prevalent type, followed by violations of sovereign rights, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and illegal trespassing.[6] China was the most active country in these incidents, followed by Indonesia and the US (as result of FONOP). In the South China Sea, China's Coast Guard played a prominent role in these incidents, followed by the navy, other state actors, air force, and survey vessels. This highlights China's ability to project power at sea, enabling it to deploy various state actors to multiple disputed areas simultaneously through grey zone strategy. While Chinese actors tended to employ non-violent approaches in dealing with these incidents, there is tendency toward assertiveness and use of violence in creative ways (i.e. pointing military grade laser to Philippines vessel). Indonesia takes note of this development and formulates a whole-government approach to overcome silo mentality of its maritime security actors. US maritime projection, while seems to carry more benign intention, can still result in the perception of violation. Recently, the Indonesian TNI commander named the US as country with most violations to Indonesian airspace, especially its military plane. [7]
Second, in addition to Taiwan, the South China Sea has become a potential flashpoint for a direct confrontation between the two giants. US’ Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the region have led to increased tensions, especially with China.[8] FONOPs is a controversial tactic, even within the US coalition, as it can be risky if not executed by experienced sailors[9] and the majority of these operations involve the use of destroyers. Between 2015-2021, the Paracel Islands (18 times) and the Spratly Islands (15 times) were the most targeted areas for FONOPs.
Third, there is a concern about an arms race in the region that fuels instability, with smaller countries potentially getting caught in the line of fire. This concern is particularly significant in the context of AUKUS. While the main deal is to provide nuclear-powered submarines to Australia by the late 2030s/early 2040s, the US and UK also plan to station their nuclear submarines in Australia. In the case of future war, possibility of Australia’s involvement and the use of its military base to launch attack means Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Philippines, under international law, must allow its sea lane to be accessed by warships. Different standing present different challenges and soul-searching for ASEAN member countries. Indonesia as a neutral party, must ponder a way to pursue capability to deny power projection of belligerent through its airspace. On the other hand, Singapore and Philippines, with special logistics arrangement with the US, need to have a deep reflection on the implication of allowing its territory and infrastructure to be used by the warring parties during the war. Similar soul-searching needs to be undertaken by Cambodia, which has a special arrangement with China for the logistical support of its aircraft carrier.
Divergence and Convergence in Southeast Asia Countries in Response to Maritime Power Projection
Southeast Asia is defined by its diversity, encompassing various aspects such as ethnicity, cultures, religion, geography, economies, politics, and external influences. This diversity is a key factor contributing to ASEAN's challenges in achieving coherence and a shared sense of purpose.[10] Some ASEAN members see the rising trend of maritime power projection as threats, while some others have different perceptions and priorities. Militarisation of the South China Sea by China, as well as several incidents occurring in the disputed areas, are seen as a strategic challenge by claimant countries and to some extent for Indonesia - whose Natuna Sea has been claimed as part of Chinese nine dash line. Especially so for Philippines and Vietnam that have tasted first headedly China’s blockage and harassment in the disputed area.[11] On the other hand, announcement of AUKUS in 2012 served as the other test of history by separating those who welcome the partnership - such as Singapore, Philippines, and Vietnam - from others that cautiously scrutinise the idea - such as Indonesia and Malaysia. [12] Initially, there were concerns about the potential for an arms race and conflict escalation. However, Indonesia has come to accept the reality that minilateralism initiatives like AUKUS cannot be easily stifled. Instead, Indonesia emphasizes the importance of proceeding with transparency in such endeavours.
There has been concern about ASEAN’s sense of urgency and level of consensus when it comes it maritime security concerns, especially with the organisation’s responses to the unfolding of maritime conflict in the South China Sea. Huang, using discourse analysis of ASEAN Summit Statements 2012-2018, found the inconsistency in the way the summit responds to dynamics in the South China Sea and that ASEAN fail to maintain high-level of consensus.[13] For example, In the ASEAN Summit held in May 2014, ASEAN made a strong statement about respecting freedom of navigation and overflight above the South China Sea, following China’s activities in the contested area of Vietnam EEZ. The next Summit, that took place in November 2014, failed to rally a collective approach to press for further concession or adjustment from China. The inconsistent patterns continued until today.
Only a limited number of Southeast Asian leaders seem willing to make the necessary expensive domestic and economic sacrifices for substantial and long-term investments in offensive military capabilities. Economic slowdown and domestic issues affect the progress of defence modernisation and cooperation in the region. Out of seven countries, that is Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Vietnam, only two (Philippines and Thailand) recorded an increase in arms import in the last five years compared to half a decade before.
While Southeast Asian states do not really refrain from employing their maritime security forces, including navy, as the primary response to China's actions in the South China Sea, ASEAN places a strong emphasis on diplomatic responses to address the deployment of maritime forces in the region. The aim is to pursue conflict management without resorting to formal sanctions or threats (who have the power in ASEAN to execute sanction anyway). The ASEAN Indo-Pacific Outlook document underscores the importance of non-violent approaches to problem-solving and multilateralism. Additionally, ASEAN seeks to achieve a balance by engaging middle power countries, like France and India to sign Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ), in addition to traditional partners like Japan, South Korea, and Australia, as part of its norms-setting agenda. The US is not the only balancer in the region, as their calls for outright balancing against China's rise are viewed as more aligned with the long-term concerns and strategies of the US to maintain its position in the region, rather than reflecting the immediate security concerns of ASEAN member states. ASEAN rebalancing with other middle power is also inevitable, considering the decline of Russia as the region’s no. 1 arms supplier, will affect the region in two ways: (1) it reduce the readiness of military that operate their weapon systems, such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia; (2) it force Southeast Asia that rely on Russia as counterbalance against China, to find an alternative partner who can fill Russian shoes. Questions remains whether ASEAN can go beyond norms setting, especially in the brink of open conflict between superpowers.
Curie Maharani, a lecturer for the streaming of Conflict and Security Studies at Binus University, Jakarta, Indonesia
[1] David Shambaugh, Where Great Powers Meet: America and China in Southeast Asia (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2021), p. 263.
[2] Stephen Biddle, dan Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,” Quarterly Journal: International Security 41, no. 1 (2016): 7-48, 10.1162/ISEC_a_00249
[3] For practical explanation on FONOPS, see Eleanor Freund, “Freedom of Navigation in the South China See”, Special Report, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, June 2017, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/SCS%20Report%20-%20web.pdf. The US conducts FONOPs worldwide.
[4] Jonah Hill. “US Freedom of Navigation Operations reveal its security strategy”. Naval Technology, April 24 2023, https://www.naval-technology.com/news/us-freedom-of-navigation-operations-reveals-us-security-strategy/.
[5] Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia”, Quarterly Journal: International Security 41:1 (2016): pp. 7-48, 10.1162/ISEC_a_00249; Leszek Buszynski, “The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and US-China Strategic Rivalry”, The Washington Quarterly, 35:1, pp. 139-156.
[6] Curie Maharani, “Maritime Incidents in South China Sea, 2012-2021”, Presentation at JAS conference, 14 October 14 2022.
[7] “Panglima TNI: Pesawat AS Paling Banyak Langgar Wilayah Udara RI”, CNN, 11 July 2023, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20230711122746-12-971990/panglima-tni-pesawat-as-paling-banyak-langgar-wilayah-udara-ri.
[8] Sam LaGrone, “U.S. Warship Sails Past Disputed South China Sea Artificial Island in Freedom of Navigation Mission,” USNI News, 23 March 2018, https://news.usni.org/2018/03/23/u-s-warship-sails-past-disputed-south-china-sea-artificial-island-freedom-navigation-mission.
[9] Christian Wirth, “Whose ‘Freedom of Navigation’? Australia, China, the United States and the making of order in the ‘Indo-Pacific’”, The Pacific Review 32: 4 (November 2018): pp. 475-504, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2018.1515788.
[10] David Shambaugh, Where Great Powers Meet: America and China in Southeast Asia (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2021), pp. 27.
[11] Renato Cruz De Castro, “Incident at Reed Bank: A Crisis in the Philippines’ China Policy”, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 20 June 2019, https://amti.csis.org/incident-at-reed-bank-a-crisis-in-the-philippines-china-policy/; “Why are tensions running high in the South China Sea dispute?”, South China Morning Post, 16 February 2019, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/article/2186449/explained-south-china-sea-dispute.
[12] Arie Afriansyah and Curie Maharani, “AUKUS and Australia’s future nuclear submarine: Choices left for ASEAN”, The Jakarta Post, 1 October 2021, https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2021/09/30/aukus-and-australias-future-nuclear-submarine-choices-left-for-asean.html.
[13] Chin-Hao Huang, “ASEAN CONSENSUS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT, 2012-2018”, (Columbia University, New York: Columbia University Press, 2022), pp. 43.
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